A rule which is not about to be dethronedThe microbiological analysis of urine is 6It is true that the flights are usually longerSince the annual low point on 14 June at 5But most existed already before the crisisIf 80 of the turnover of the company EUR 1There is interest to analyze without delayThis is the reality the ongoing dialogue withFree commute in mercantilism or economic warNonagénaire the hidden wish is doing very wellThe United States are about to repeat, in their response to the crisis, the errors and excesses had marked reaction regulatory to the Enron scandal and other from the beginning of the 2000s While the France and the Germany to move properly of the return of outlandish banking bonuses, while public finances and the "real economy" continue to pay the Bill of the financial crisis, this issue seems to us in a surprising debate on corporate governance ("corporate governance"). A host of legislative and regulatory initiatives hotly debated between a plethora of stakeholders and experts, are intended to strengthen the control of the shareholders on the Board of Directors and the management of listed companies. Of course, a large number of these initiatives have precisely to better supervise the Executive compensation, giving on this subject a right to look at the shareholders ("say on pay"). But beyond this legitimate concern, the rise of this debate in the United States, in response to the crisis, is not less concern several titles.
First, unlike the 2001-2002, the current crisis is not due to failures of governance of large listed companies, with the exception, of course, those of the financial sector. But the internal failures at financial institutions, which have largely contributed to the crisis, are of a regulatory system far too specific to justify a global reform of corporate governance, applicable to all companies using public savings. Moreover, the specificity of the financial sector is such that the general orientation of the reform movement of the "corporate governance" - reinforcing the power of shareholders - contrary to the requirements of sectoral regulation. As the crisis has brutally confirmed, if there is one area where the interests of the shareholders may differ from those of society as a whole, it is the planet finance.
The question of market operators bonus illustrates this potential conflict: shareholders (investment fund) and other market operators have interest in risk-taking for outstanding wages, and are ready to give traders incentives appropriate to this effect, especially if the State is to serve as a guarantor of last resort. The financial crisis is precisely to origin of excessive risk taken, induced by a mix of incentives and pressure short-termistes from financial investors.
Therefore, the general strengthening of the control of the shareholders is not the solution to the problem of banking remuneration and faulty governance of financial institutions. In reality, the debate now shaking Washington and Wall Street is that resurgence, through the crisis, the offensive since 15 years by the activists of capitalism (i.e. financial) stockowner against what Galbraith called once the technostructure of large companies American.
And this is where the shoe pinches. If a better control of the shareholders on the remuneration of managers (in particular the adequacy of performance) is desirable - subject to do not deprive the crossing management and boards of Directors of their managerial responsibilities-, the regulation of the financial sector notes, public authorities due to the specificities of general interest to them (the prevention of systemic risk in addition to other more traditional concerns such as the protection of depositors).
The focus of the American regionallybalanced debate on the reform of the "corporate governance", over the regulation of banking remuneration (and market activities underlying), is thus concern with the approach of the G20 in Pittsburgh. Beyond the issue political and moral posed the enormity of the amounts involved and the partial responsibility of these practices in public deficits and unemployment brought about by the crisis, massive reforming banking remuneration structures interested public authorities. And, the triple point of view of the moderation of risk taking, their impact on the capitalization of financial institutions, and the imbalance that they induce in the allocation of talent between the finance and other sectors of activity, including science and technology. Such a reform requires clearly an international agreement to eliminate the risk of distortion of competition which justify the current standstill. States and financial institutions have any interest, under penalty of the underlying issue of the speculative activities of banks and the profits that they withdraw explode on the public stage.
Finally, also symbolic and sensitive is (for public opinion, the political classes, and their multiple beneficiaries), the question of banking bonus is only an element of a comprehensive reform of the financial regulation, it must not overshadow or take hostage.
